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Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural Barriers to Rights
Enforcement
Howard M. Wasserman†

The story of police reform and of “policing the police” has become the story
of video and video evidence. “Record everything to know the truth” has become
the singular mantra and video has become the singular tool for ensuring police
accountability and reform and for enforcing the rights of victims of police
misconduct. Video can vindicate the public’s rights against police misconduct,
assist government in punishing misbehaving officers and departments, and enable
agencies to reform problematic and constitutionally defective policies and practices.
From the government’s perspective, video enables officers to prove that their
conduct was constitutionally appropriate, avoiding civil and criminal liability for the
officers and the departments. And it allows governments to rebut criticism that it is
failing to protect the public.
Three broad categories of video of police-citizen encounters have emerged.
The first is police-controlled video, including body cameras, dashboard cameras,
traffic-light cameras, and other government-controlled and -operated surveillance.
The second is citizen1-controlled video, created from smart phones and cell
phones, small digital video and audio recorders, private-business surveillance
cameras, and similar privately owned, controlled, and operated recording
technology, distributed through blogs and social-networking sites. The third,
although less-discussed, is live mainstream media coverage of large or breaking
police-public encounters,2 such as the saturation coverage of the protests cum riots
in Ferguson in 2014.3 The media also enhances the power and force of the first two
categories by publicizing and distributing “viral” videos created by other sources.
Arming everyone, public and private, with recording devices produces a
balance of power in which all sides record police-public encounters. Big Brother is
watching the people, but the people are watching Big Brother. Ric Simmons
recognized the special potential role of citizen-controlled video in ensuring
government accountability: “It is now evident that Orwell’s vision was wrong.
Modern technology has turned out to be the totalitarian state’s worst enemy . . . .

Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Jud Campbell and Margot Kaminsky for
comments on early drafts. Thanks to David Ardia and Mary-Rose Papandrea and the editors of the
North Carolina Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1 I use the word “citizen” to mean all members of the public, without intending to distinguish
individuals who are citizens of the United States and individuals who are otherwise present in the
United States, lawfully or otherwise.
2 TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC
PLACES 257-58 2009); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 604 (2009).
3 Candice Norwood, Media Framing in Black and White: The Construction of Black Male Identity, in
Ferguson’s Fault Lines: The Race Quake That Rocked a Nation 167, 167-68 (Kimberly Jade
Norwood, ed., 2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
831, 832-33 (2015).
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[I]t is the people who are watching the government, not the other way around.”4
Mary Fan praises this balanced “modern condition where everyone has incentive to
record to contest or control the narrative.”5 She explains that
people and the police are recording each other from all directions,
making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor. I am recording
you, you are recording me, and the police are recording us too,
because the people demand it. The lines of power and control
radiate from all directions as people seek to document their
perceptions and thus shape the narrative.6
Jocelyn Simonson offers an example of institutionalized mutual surveillance in the
practice of “organized copwatching—groups of local residents who wear uniforms,
carry visible recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and film police-citizen
interactions in an effort to hold police departments accountable to the populations
they police.”7
Multiple constituencies support expanded use of bodycams and similar
technology as the solution to police misconduct and the source of police reform.
Fan argues that this universality of support demonstrates the “interest convergence
thesis,” in which the “convergence of diverse interests across strange bedfellows
produces major shifts in policy.”8
Broad public support is reflected in opinion polls9 and in support for a
WhiteHouse.gov petition shortly after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and
corresponding protests in Ferguson, Missouri.10 The Obama Administration and
the Department of Justice under attorneys general Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch
promoted video, by police and the public, as a major path to police reform.
Promotion efforts included grants to law-enforcement agencies to establish or
enhance body-camera programs, such as $ 75-million award in December 201411
and a $20-million to 106 agencies in September 2016.12 DOJ entered consent
Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Privacy and
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 532 (2007).
5 Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 908
(2017).
6 Introduction to Prof. Fan’s UNC contribution
7 Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 393, 408 (2016).
8 Fan, supra note ___, at 927.
9 Sharp Racial Divisions in Reactions to Brown, Garner Decisions: Many Blacks Expect Police–Minority Relations
to Worsen, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp-racialdivisions-in-reactions-to-brown-garner-decisions/
10 Aja J. Williams, Petition Asking Cops to Wear Body Cameras Passes 100K, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014,
12:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/20/mike-brown-lawpetition/14336311/.
11 Prof. Harris UNC Contribution
12 Department of Justice Awards Over $20 Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn Camera Programs, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-over-20million-law-enforcement-body-worn-camera-programs.
4

decrees in civil-rights actions13 against police departments in Ferguson14 and
Baltimore15 that required both departments to establish and maintain effective
body-camera programs. Federal legislators have offered bodycam proposals.16 A
2014 joint report by the Department of Justice and the Police Executive Research
Forum (“PERF”) offered more than 30 recommendations for state and local
departments establishing body cameras, the central point being that agency policies
and training materials must provide clear, specific, and detailed guidelines on all
aspects of the use of cameras.17 The 2015 Final Report of the President’s Task
Force on 21st-Century Policing highlighted the potential for new policing
technology, including cameras, as one of the pillars of modern policing and
recommended expanded study and use.18 The American Civil Liberties Union
drafted model body-camera legislation, requiring recording of all encounters,
subject to limited exceptions, with broad disclosure of videos.19
Two stakeholders do not share this enthusiasm. One is rank-and-file police
officers and officer unions. While initially supportive, they have backed away,
concerned with lack of control over the decision when to record and over
subsequent release and use of the resulting video, which may cause officers
embarrassment or worse.20
The more problematic holdout is the Trump Administration and the
Department of Justice under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who reject the basic
premise of the need for police reform or the propriety of federal oversight as a
vehicle for achieving it. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, the White
House web page announced a policy of “Standing Up For Our Law Enforcement
Community.”21 The new Administration would “honor our men and women in
uniform and . . . support their mission of protecting the public,” and recognized
that the “dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America is wrong [and] the Trump
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141; Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721,
741-44 (2017).
14 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson (E.D. Mo. 2016) (No. 4:16-CV-00180-CDP),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/833431/download
15 Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep’t of Baltimore (D. Md. 2017) (No. 1:17-CV-00099JKB), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3284089/Conset-Decree-Agreement.pdf
16 Creating Accountability by Making Effective Recording Available Act of 2015 (Police CAMERA
Act), H.R. 1680, 114th Cong. (2015); Arthur Delaney, Adam Schiff Pushes Body Cameras for Cops,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/27/body-worncameras_n_5722762.html.
17 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), available at
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20
a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf
18 https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf (Pillar 3).
19 A MODEL ACT FOR REGULATING THE USE OF WEARABLE BODY CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
(AM. C.L. UNION 2017), https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-bodycameras-law-enforcement.
20 Harris UNC Contribution; White UNC Contribution
21 Standing Up For Our Law Enforcement Community, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/law-enforcement-community (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
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Administration will end it.”22 Early in his tenure as Attorney General, Sessions
pledged to pull back from his predecessors’ aggressive use of § 14141 actions and
consent decrees imposing federal judicial oversight of local police departments, in
favor of helping police officers better perform their jobs without undermining
respect for law enforcement or making their jobs more difficult.23 Sessions later
issued a memorandum identifying a series of principles the department would seek
to advance, including promoting officer safety, officer morale, and public respect
for police work.24 It is not clear how body cameras fit the administration’s new
mission and focus with respect to police reform—whether cameras and video help
police better perform their jobs or whether they reflect an anti-police attitude and a
new means of interfering and undermining respect for police.
The Trump Administration’s recalcitrance on police-controlled recording
places in stark relief the dramatic and immediate change from the Obama
Administration with respect to all federal efforts at police reform. The ancien
administration made extensive use of § 14141 civil actions for equitable relief
againsy patterns-and-practices of constitutionally violative behavior in state and
local law-enforcement agencies, obtaining consent decrees against almost twenty
departments.25 The Trump Administration and Sessions DOJ have rejected the
premise of federal oversight of local police departments or that patterns-andpractices of constitutional misconduct exist, as opposed to occasional lone bad
actors.26 Again, it remains to be seen how that affects the use of police- or citizencontrolled video. The department sought a 90-day delay so it could reconsider or
revise the Baltimore consent decree; the district judge refused, insisting that the
time for negotiation had passed.27
Citizen-controlled video has become as prominent and essential as policecontrolled video in reform efforts. The Ferguson and Baltimore consent decrees
required the departments to recognize, respect, and train officers to protect the
right to “observe and record officers in the public discharge of their duties in all
traditionally public spaces”28 and to “peacefully photograph or record police
officers performing their law enforcement duties in public.”29 Ferguson previously
acknowledged First Amendment protection for the right to record in a consent
decree resolving a § 1983 action arising from the 2014 protests.30 Six federal courts
Id.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions: “We Are In Danger” of Rising Violence, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 2017, 12:39
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/28/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-wedanger-rising-violence/98524544/.
24 Jeffrey B. Sessions, Supporting Federal, State, Local, and Tribale Law Enforcement, DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148Consentdecreebaltimore.html.
25 Rushin and Edwards, supra note 779, App. B.
26 Sessions Memo; supra.
27 Daniel Victor, Judge Approves Consent Decree to Overhaul Baltimore Police Department, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2017).
28 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, supra note ___.
29 Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep’t of Baltimore, supra note ___.
30 Consent Decree, Hussein v. Cty. of St. Louis, No. 4:14-cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2014).
22
23

of appeals—the Eleventh Circuit,31 Ninth Circuit,32 First Circuit,33 Seventh
Circuit,34 Fifth Circuit,35 and Third Circuit36—have recognized a First Amendment
right for members of the public to record police and other public officials
performing their public functions in public spaces. In 2012, DOJ argued in
litigation that “[r]ecording governmental officers engaged in public duties is a form
of speech through which private individuals may gather and disseminate
information of public concern, including the conduct of law enforcement
officers.”37
The period of late 2017-2018 offers an opportune moment to consider video
and its role in police reform, in criminal prosecution, and in civil-rights litigation
surrounding.
This year marks significant technological anniversaries.38 The iPhone, which
has made citizen video pervasive, turned ten in 2017,39 while digital video-recording
technology, alone and in cell phones, is about 15 years old.40 More than half of
adults in the United States have smartphones and more than 90% have cell
phones.41 Dashcam technology was introduced in the late 1980s, but became
prominent approximately 20 years ago in the early ‘00s, promoted through federal
funding for recording technology in response to an increase in public assaults on
officers and in allegations of police abuse.42 Body-camera technology developed in
Britain in 2005 and came to the United States around 10 years ago.43
This year also marks significant legal and political anniversaries. The transition
in civil-rights enforcement commitments from Obama to Trump is in full swing
more than one year into the Trump presidency. It has been ten years since the
Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris44 approved summary judgment based on dashcam
video of a police chase, concluding that video evidence can “speak for itself”45 in
telling a singular story with which no reasonable jury could disagree.46 It has been
eight years since publication of the Harvard Law Review article in which Dan
Kahan, David Hoffman, and Daniel Braman destroyed the underlying premise of
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 2005).
33 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
34 American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
35 Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017).
36 Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017).
37 Letter of U.S. Dep’t of Justice in Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, May 14, 2012.
38 Cite to Stoughton UNC Contribution throughout this section
39 Arielle Pardes, iPhone Turns 10: How It Became the Everything Machine, WIRED, June 29, 2017.
40 Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to
Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339-40 (2011).
41 Fan, supra note ___, at 907.
42 Bradley X. Barbour, Note, Big Budget Productions with Limited Release: Video Retention Issues With BodyWorn Cameras, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1725, 1730-32 (2017).
43 Id.; Mary D. Fan, Missing Body Camera Videos: Evidentiary Fairness Beyond Blame, 52 GA. L. REV. ___, 9
(forthcoming 2018).
44 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
45 Id. at 1775 n.5.
46 Id. at 1775-76.
31
32

Scott, showing that what the Scott video (and, by logical extension, all video) showed
depended on who was watching.47 And it has been ten years since Simmons’
insight, prior to the exponential acceleration of the technological revolution of
smartphones and body-cams, about Orwell and the power of the public to watch,
record, and check the government.
I have written about video evidence, in particular the insistence that body
cameras offer the solution to the problem of police misconduct. I have described
my position as uncertain-but-cautious hope and support—cameras are a good idea,
but the details of how camera programs operate and how video evidence is used in
litigation and public debate matter.48 The rhetoric surrounding recording of police
must reflect the reality—the benefits of video and video evidence in providing
police transparency, accountability, and accuracy in litigation, while perhaps real,
should not be overstated. And “perhaps” is an important qualifier, as a study of
body cameras involving more than 2000 officers in Washington, D.C. showed no
“detectable average effects” on documented uses of force, citizen complaints, or
behavior by police or citizens in public encounters.49 The more-mixed empirical
record has not dampened the technological enthusiasm.
This Article approaches the problem of video evidence and recording of police
from a different angle. It explores procedural issues surrounding video recording
and video evidence as they arise in civil50 and criminal51 litigation challenging, ex
ante or ex post, police misconduct; efforts to hold individual officers or departments
accountable; and efforts to reform departmental policies, regulations, and practices.
Part I criticizes the continued belief among courts, government officials, and
commentators that video “speaks for itself,” the procedural and evidentiary errors
to which that belief leads, and the problems it creates for civil-rights enforcement.
Part II considers how video creates evidentiary advantages for the government—
whether prosecution and police in a criminal prosecution or defendant officers in
civil-rights litigation. Part III explores the promise and limits of citizen-created and
–controlled video, considering the existence and nature of a First Amendment right
to record police performing their public duties in public and the problems
individuals encounter in attempting to enforce and vindicate that right. Part IV
considers the effects video has outside of litigation; these include executive
decisions to pursue criminal charges against police officers for misconduct and to

Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009).
48 Howard M. Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope of Body Cameras, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES: THE RACE
QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION 217, 218 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 543, 547 (2017); Wasserman, Moral Panics,
supra note ___, at 832-33; Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision, supra note ___, at 608-09.
49 Randomized Controlled Trial of the Metropolitan Police Dep’t Body-Worn Camera Program, THE LAB@DC,
http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/; Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017); White UNC Contribution
50 42 U.S.C. § 1983; id. at § 14141
51 18 U.S.C. § 242.
47

settle civil-rights litigation in response to public outrage at a video-recorded
incident.
I.

“Allow the Video to Speak for Itself”

Scott v. Harris was a § 1983 action arising from a high-speed police chase that
ended when the pursuing officer intentionally rammed the fleeing car, causing it to
careen off the road and into a ravine, leaving the driver permanently paralyzed.52
The primary evidence in the record was dashcam video from the pursuing officer’s
squad car, which the Court posted to its website so it could “speak for itself.”53
With only Justice Stevens dissenting, the Court held that summary judgment in
favor of the officer was proper on the driver’s Fourth Amendment claim, because
the video told only one, “quite . . . different” story from the driver’s testimony—
that the driver, traveling at a high rate of speed and weaving in and out of traffic,
posed an imminent risk to persons in the immediate area, making constitutionally
reasonable the use of force to terminate the chase and end the threat to the
public.54 Video, in the Court’s telling, provided conclusive objective evidence
telling a singular story. That single story overrode, and allowed the court on
summary judgment to disregard, all competing evidence, including the victim’s
testimony that he was driving safely (if fast) and did not pose a threat to the public
because the roads were empty.55 The Court could disregard that testimony because
it was “blatantly contradicted” by the record56—that is, by the video, which
possessed one objective, obvious meaning that a court could determine and that no
reasonable jury could understand differently, regardless of how it judged the
victim’s testimony and credibility.
Scott fundamentally misunderstood video and video evidence. Video does not
possess a singular meaning or present a singular story to all viewers that obviates a
factfinder or allows the court such leeway on summary judgment. Video functions
as any other piece of evidence—it captures and offers limited information and its
meaning must be processed and understood by whoever views or hears that
information.57
From the front end of what video presents comes the insight familiar to every
undergraduate film student—what video “says” or “means” is limited by what is
inside and outside the camera’s frame, what is included or not included in the
image, and the “camera’s perspective (angles) and breadth of view (wide shots and
focus).”58 The meaning of a video changes with the length of the video, steadiness

Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 378 n.5.
54 Id. at 379-80.
55 Id. at 378-79.
56 Id. at 380.
57 Stoughton UNC Contribution
58 Jessica M. Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, U. MD. L.J. RACE, REL., GENDER & Class 17, 29, 38 (2008).
52
53

of the camera,59 and other details of the recording, such as distances, perspectives,
light, color, sound, sound quality, visual quality, and angles.60 “All films have a
point of view or voice,”61 but the voice and story change from different angles,
details, and perspectives reflected in different videos.62
The back end recognizes that video, like any other piece of evidence, must be
processed, interpreted, and understood by the factfinder.63 The work of Dan
Kahan and his co-authors at Yale’s Cultural Cognition Project64 has explored and
revealed the nature of and influences on that interpretation. Their empirical studies
have exposed the fallacy of Scott and those who insist that video offers an absolute
truth or singularity. They show that video does not speak for itself; what video
“says” depends on who is watching and the “priors” each viewer brings with her.
Video’s meaning is affected by a complex combination of cultural, demographic,
social, political, racial, gender, ideological, and experiential characteristics. That is,
reasonable jurors could disagree about the meaning of a video because that
meaning is influenced, if not determined, by the personal and political
characteristics each juror brings to her task of viewing, interpreting, and
understanding.65
Two Kahan studies are particularly relevant to this discussion. The first is the
original 2009 study in Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe, in which researchers took
the Court up on its offer to let video speak for itself by showing the chase video to
study participants. While the majority of viewers in the study interpreted the Scott
video as the Court did, the minority of viewers who disagreed with the Court’s
view shared demographic and ideological characteristics and “a distinctive
understanding of social reality that informs their views of the facts.”66 The second
study is They Saw a Protest, in which the authors showed video depicting a crowd
outside a building that was alternately identified as a reproductive-health clinic or a
military recruitment center during the period in which openly LGBT persons were
barred from military service. Opinions about abortion and about LGBT rights
corresponded with whether a viewer saw a peaceful-but-emphatic protest or a riot
and threatening blockade of the building.67
Both studies explain public reactions to high-profile video cases. Viewer
positions and experiences on race, class, law-and-order, and the theory of “broken
Id. at 38; Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
Arts 107, 147, 161 (2005); Jessica Silbey, Criminal Performance: Film, Autobiography, and Confession 37
N.M. L. REV. 189, 202-03, 214 (2007).
60 Silbey, Cross-Examining, supra note ___, at 38; Silbey, Filmmaking, supra note ___, at 146; Wasserman,
Orwell’s Vision, supra note ___, at 640.
61 Silbey, Cross-Examining, at 29
62 Silbey, Filmmaking, at 147.
63 Id. at 173.
64 The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://www.culturalcognition.net/.
65 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, and Danieli Evans, “They Saw a Protest”:
Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN L. REV. 851, 854-55 (2012); Kahan,
Hoffman, and Braman, supra note ___, at 841.
66 Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman, supra note ___, at 865, 886.
67 Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, and Evans, supra note ___, at 883-85.
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windows” policing influence interpretations of video of the strangulation death of
Eric Garner at the hands of New York City Police Officer Daniel Pantaleo.68
Reactions to video of protests and police attempts to break-up protests—in
Ferguson and elsewhere following the shooting death of Michael Brown,69 the
non-indictment of Officer Darren Wilson in the Brown shooting,70 or in St. Louis
following the 2017 acquittal of Officer Jason Stockley in the shooting death of
Anthony Lamar Smith71—track viewer positions on law-and-order, the freedom of
speech, the propriety of public protest in public spaces, and, likely, the underlying
events and judicial decisions being protested.72 A viewer who believes that the
protested shooting was wrongful and that public protest is essential First
Amendment activity promoting social change is more likely to see a constitutionally
protected peaceful protest broken up by over-zealous police; a viewer who believes
the shooting was justified is more likely to see outnumbered police struggling to
maintain order against a lawless riot.
Nevertheless, courts and commentators continue to espouse Scott’s mistaken
position on the “truth” of recording evidence and how it can be used in litigation.
Video continues to be treated as an objective, unbiased, transparent observer of
events that evenhandledly reproduces reality for the viewer, providing raw,
unambiguous, and unbiased evidence showing conclusively and certainly what
happened in the real world. Courts continue to use video to relieve themselves of
traditional reliance on one-sided testimony to reconstruct events, to find a
necessary check on the fallibility of human perception, and to allow factfinders to
replay and perceive events free of adverseness, passion, and partisanship that
plagues traditional witness testimony.73 Video continues to be seen as more likely
to be “much more accurate than other means of conveying information,” which
“increases the credibility and reliability of expression but also may allow more
information to be translated quickly in a manner unfiltered by a third-party
account.”74 In recognizing a First Amendment right to record, the Third Circuit
argued that “to record what there is the right for the eye to see or the ear to
hear corroborates or lays aside subjective impressions for objective facts. Hence to
record is to see and hear more accurately.”75
Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold During Arrest, Autopsy Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014).
69 Annys Shin, Recalling the protests, riots after fatal police shooting of Michael Brown, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE
(Aug. 3, 2017); Chad Flanders, Ferguson and the First Amendment, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES, supra
note ___, at 198, 206-07.
70 Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not Indicted, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 24, 2014); Nicholas St. Fleus, Scenes From a Ferguson Protest in New York City, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 25, 2014).
71 Mark Berman, Wesley Lowery, and Andrew deGrandpre, Police and protesters clash in St. Louis after
former officer who shot black driver acquitted on murder charges, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2017).
72 Flanders, supra note ___, at 198.
73 Fan, supra note ___, at 955; Justin Marceau and Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video
Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1010 (2016).
74 Marceau and Chen, supra note ___, at 1009-10.
75 Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 35, 3593 (3d Cir. 2017).
68

The problem is a failure to distinguish persuasiveness from moral certainty.
Video may be a more “credible representation of reality” that can “persuade all the
more powerfully, generating less counterargument and retaining the viewers’
belief.”76 Video can “validate or undermine” accounts of events and “help resolve
the conflict not only for the parties immediately involved but also in the interests
of the broader community.”77 But courts must resist what literature scholar Peter
Brooks calls the “reality effect,” the idea that video is, in and of itself, the thing or
event depicted, rather than one more piece of evidence of the thing depicted that a
factfinder can consider and use.78 The failure to distinguish the concepts
undermines the process in which courts resolve disputes.
The Supreme Court repeated its mistake, this time unanimously, in Plumhoff v.
Rickard.79 The Court again approved summary judgment in favor of the defendant
officers on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim arising from a high-speed
chase, again understanding the dashcam video as telling one obvious story of the
plaintiff posing a grave risk to public safety that officers properly terminated with
deadly force, even at the risk of serious injury or death to the “fleeing” motorist.80
As in Scott, the Court accepted the video in the record to show conclusively that the
plaintiff posed a threat to the public with his “outrageously reckless” driving.81 The
video “conclusively disprove[d]” the plaintiff’s allegations about whether the chase
was over, whether he intended to resume flight, and whether he still was
maneuvering the car.82 And the video showed that the driver was “obviously
pushing down on the accelerator” and that he threw the car into reverse “in an
attempt to escape.”83 The Court could decide this from its review of the video,
with no further proceedings or factfinder consideration necessary or appropriate.
Plumhoff did not acknowledge the role of video in its decision, as had Scott. Justice
Alito’s majority opinion recited facts and described what happened during the
chase, without identifying video as the source of its facts or conclusions or placing
the video on the Court website for the public to watch and consider. Only
references to video during argument84 and the Court’s reliance on Scott as
controlling precedent indicated video’s prominent role in the case.
The evidentiary limits of video become clear in cases with multiple or
competing videos. Several studies show that a second video, taken from a different
and often broader angle, tells a different, often contradictory, story than does a

Richard K. Sherwin, Introduction, in POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard K. Sherwin ed.,
2006).
77 Marceau & Chen, supra note ___, at 1010.
78 Peter Brooks, Scott v. Harris: The Supreme Court’s Reality Effect, 29 L. & LITERATURE 143, 147 (2017);
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single, narrow body-camera video.85 There is a reason that every witness to an
incident or to police activities has her phone out—each wants to create and keep a
unique record of events because each resulting video is a unique piece of
evidence.86 But if different videos of the same occurrence can tell different stories
depending on the internal elements of that video—especially a different angle or
different width of visual field—no one video can be correct or tell the entire story.
During argument in 2017’s Hernandez v. Mesa,87 the Court ignored an example
that should have shown how courts have gone astray in their reliance on video.
Hernandez was a Bivens action against a border-patrol officer arising from a crossborder shooting—the officer was standing in the United States when he fired,
while the victim, a Mexican national, was standing at or near the Rio Grande
culvert marking the U.S./Mexico border. The officer was cleared by a departmental
investigation.88 The incident was captured by several surveillance cameras, with one
video from one camera circulating on YouTube. During argument, the following
exchange occurred between Justice Sotomayor and counsel for the United States:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- go back to my hypothetical. Border
policemen are shooting indiscriminately from within the United
States across the border. This is the allegation in this complaint.
And I understand you say the government has investigated and
sees the facts differently. Have you seen the – the film that
appeared on the YouTube?
MR. KNEEDLER: I have.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I did, and I can't square the police
officer's account of this incident with that film.
MR. KNEEDLER: There were other videos. The -- the -- the
press release -- nothing in the record and nothing in a -- in a public
account -- * * * ---there was other evidence and other videosurveillance videos that were taken into account in the
investigation.89
Unfortunately, everyone missed the point and its significance for the debates
over cameras and video evidence. If other videos could justify a different result in
the departmental investigation despite adverse video, no single video can be
conclusive as a matter of law. Every video offers one unique perspective out of
multiple perspectives on one story, none necessarily truer than another.90 If other
(non-video) evidence could justify a different outcome in the departmental
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investigation despite the adverse video, then contradicting non-video evidence
should play a similar role in civil-rights litigation, precluding summary judgment
based on the court’s singular view of what video says and disregard for contrary
non-video evidence. As a court on summary judgment cannot choose between
competing witness accounts,91 so should it not choose between competing videos
or between competing video and testimonial evidence. A litigation factfinder
should be given an opportunity to review all of disparate pieces of evidence,
determine their meaning and credibility, and make its decision.
The public reaction to the outcomes of prosecutions of police officers in cases
involving publicly disclosed body-cam and dashcam evidence illustrates the error of
Scott and the correctness of Kahan’s insights that video can have multiple
reasonable meanings and messages.92 In a string of notorious cases, officers have
been not charged or not convicted in shooting cases where the incident was
recorded and the judicial decision contradicted the wider public perception of the
video, triggering public outrage, protests, and demonstrations.93 Accepting that the
public was not protesting the outcome simpliciter—a white police officer was not
convicted of shooting an African-American person, ergo the outcome was unjust
and grounds for protest—the anger must have been based on different
perceptions and understandings of the video evidence. And those different
perceptions and understandings derived from the viewers’ distinct demographics,
political attitudes, and life experiences that Kahan and his co-authors identified as
influencing viewer understanding of video. That the public could disagree with the
grand jury, jury, or judge means video cannot be singular—either different viewers
reached different conclusions about the meaning of the video or other evidence
changed the prevailing view of the video in the formal proceeding. Either way,
video did not present the single truth, but could be and was overcome by
something beyond the images themselves.
It is not clear who reached the “correct” or “accurate” result in these cases—
the non-convicting factfinders or the righteously indignant public.94 It does not
matter. The point is that video is subjective and the assumption of the video’s
objective singularity is wrong.
The judicial process must recognize and incorporate this insight, as judges are
uniquely equipped to do.95 Courts cannot throw away the ordinary rules of
evidence and procedure when video is part of the record. A court on summary
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judgment cannot view the evidence “in the light depicted by the videotape”96
because the videotape lacks a singular meaning in which other evidence can be
viewed. The video, as with any other piece of evidence, must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment because the jury (or
individual jurors) may (and statistically, some will) view the video differently than
the court, based on their attitudes and experiences. And none of those competing
viewpoints should be boxed or rejected as unreasonable.
That insight applies beyond summary judgment. It is true that at most trials,
video evidence will prevail with factfinders over competing testimonial evidence,
who see it a more salient than verbal descriptions.97 But Kahan’s studies about
viewer interpretation and scholarship about how video forms and presents its
message remain significant at trial. They should remind courts that the place for
subjective interpretations of video and comparison with non-video evidence is a
trial before a factfinder, not summary judgment that preempts the ordinary civillitigation process and labels competing understandings of video unreasonable.98
They also should remind factfinders in civil and criminal proceedings not to place
blind faith in video, but to recognize its limitations and its connections with and
complementarity to non-video evidence. Factfinders must decide the case in light
of all the evidence, including their subjective interpretation in understanding and
applying video evidence.
II.

Evidentiary Advantages for Law Enforcement

Commentators have described the evidentiary advantages that police officers
enjoy in litigation, as witnesses in criminal prosecutions against arrestees and as
defendants in civil and criminal proceedings.99 Judges and juries tend to view
officer’s testimony as more credible than that of citizens in a he-said/he-said
contest between one police officer and one suspect,100 an “ugly battle” that is
“highly imbalanced in power.”101 Judges and juries are reluctant to openly discredit
law-enforcement officer testimony, where an adverse finding that the officer is
lying or is not credible could destroy a career.102
Advocates argue that video evidence can overcome that imbalance by offering
objective information that does not depend on credibility determinations or the
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subjectivity of adversary proceedings.103 But that tendency to believe lawenforcement testimony has migrated into how courts view video evidence, with the
jury or court (on summary judgment) more likely to adopt police officers’ asserted
interpretation of the video’s singular meaning and story, at the expense of a
competing narrative of the video’s meaning. The Court did this on summary
judgment in Scott and Plumhoff. Lower courts grant summary judgment for officers
by relying on ambiguous or apparently police-friendly video104 or by ignoring
adverse video.105 This tendency accompanies a shift in law enforcement’s view of
the purpose of police-controlled video—not to reveal official wrongdoing or gain
government accountability, but to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions of
members of the public.106
The 2017 acquittal of former St. Louis police officer Michael Stockley
illustrates the tendency. Stockley was charged in state-court with murder arising
from the shooting death of Anthony Lamar Smith following a high-speed chase.
The case presented numerous recording-evidence issues. Dashcam video of the
chase captured Stokely telling his partner “we’re killing this motherfucker, count on
it” during the chase. Video of the aftermath of the chase showed Stockley walking
to the victim’s car, firing five shots, returning to his squad car and rifling through a
bag, then returning to Smith’s car. At that point, another officer turned the
dashcam off, leaving only a blurry cellphone video, taken by a bystander, as
evidence. That citizen-controlled video did not clearly show whether Stockley was
carrying a second gun (the prosecution alleged that Stockley planted a gun in
Smith’s car to set-up a self-defense defense).107
In a bench trial, the judge resolved every video issue in Stockley’s favor.
Comments about “killing” Smith were ambiguous, a means of releasing tension
during the chase rather than a statement of intent. The court drew no adverse
inferences from officers turning the dashcam off or from Stockley violating
department procedure in rifling through a bag in his car or moving back and forth
between Smith’s car and the squad car. And the ambiguity of the citizen video
meant that government had not proven that Stockley planted a second gun.108
The Sixth Circuit took a similarly officer-centric approach to video on
summary judgment in Marvin v. City of Taylor.109 The case involved claims of
excessive force arising from the arrest of the plaintiff on a DUI charge and his
transportation to the police station. Events at the station house were videotaped,
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and the court relied on the videos as the sole touchstone for its factual analysis in
reversing the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.110
But the court went a step beyond Scott. It demanded that the video
affirmatively corroborate plaintiff’s testimony and show what the court viewed as
excessive force; it felt free to ignore plaintiff testimony because the court’s view of
the video did not affirmatively support that testimony. The plaintiff alleged that
one of the defendant officers pulled him out of the car at the station house and
threw him to the ground, but the court insisted that the video did not clearly show
this and refused to credit the plaintiff’s testimony as a supplement. The video,
taken from the opposite side of the car and not offering an unobstructed view,
only showed the officer opening the door, reaching into the car, closing the door,
then bending down and helping the plaintiff to his feet; it did not show the officer
“abusing” the plaintiff. Although the video, as understood, did not blatantly
contradict the plaintiff’s assertions as in Scott, it did not support them. And by not
supporting his version, it “certainly cast[] strong doubts on [his]
characterization.”111 Plaintiff’s testimony was not enough.
Marvin also testified that the officers had gratuitously pulled his injured arm
into the small of his back while taking off the handcuffs from behind. According to
the court, while the video appeared to show the plaintiff’s arms being raised into
the small of his back, the officer also could be seen crouching when inserting the
key to unlock the cuffs, presumably to avoid making the plaintiff raise his arms.
Based on (the judges’ interpretation of) the video, the court concluded that “the
officers’ conduct cannot reasonably be construed as gratuitous.”112 The possibility
of an officer-favorable interpretation of the video justified the court adopting that
interpretation and granting summary judgment for the officers.
The competing inferences from one video and between video and testimony
could work against law enforcement and in favor of members of the public
challenging police conduct, as the 2017 prosecution of police-reform activist
Cristina Winsor illustrates. Winsor was acquitted of misdemeanor charges of
disorderly conduct and walking in a roadway, stemming from her arrest during a
police-reform protest in New York City. The state trial judge found bystandercitizen video showed something “totally different” from what officers said
happened.113
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Winsor’s case is unique and telling in several respects. The judge viewed the
officers as “quite credibl[e]” on “first blush,”114 reflecting the common judicial
tendency and turning only after the judge viewed the video. The more common
case moves in the other direction—video may look bad for the officer (as do many
videos of violent encounters and police use of force),115 but is overcome by the
officer’s testimony as to his belief about things not necessarily shown in the video
or his explanation and justification for what the video seems to show.
The contradictions between the officers’ testimony and the video of the
protest at which Winsor was arrested were obvious and objective. The conflicts did
not revolve around issues of discretion, judgments of what was reasonable in the
moment, or questions of what the officer might have subjectively feared from the
suspect. They were about objective elements in the video such as scaffolding
blocking the sidewalks (the officers said there was none, while the video showed
some)116 or the presence of white-shirted officers (the officers said none were
present, while the video showed an officer wearing a white shirt making an
arrest).117 These video images required less interpretation, so were less subject to
demographic factors affecting perception and interpretation, compared with video
of events that might or might not be a peaceful protest or that might or might not
constitute excessive force.
The stakes in play in a proceeding also affect how a trial court approaches and
interprets video, as it does other evidentiary and legal judgments.118 Judges and
juries may be willing to view the video differently, and less favorably to law
enforcement, in a misdemeanor summons case such as Winsor compared with a
high-value § 1983 action for excessive force by a plaintiff killed119 or seriously
injured120 or a prosecution of a police officer for murder arising from performance
of his dangerous duties in a dangerous situation.121
The evidentiary advantage may be enhanced when officers fail to utilize policecontrolled video technology. In her study of the frequency of police failures to
record, Fan finds that officers often fail to follow departmental regulations for
police-controlled recording, fail to record events, or fail to record them fully and
completely.122 Removing video from the evidentiary record returns the factfinding
weight to competing testimony, restoring the potential officer advantage.
Fan’s solution to the problem is to undo the evidentiary benefit. She proposes
that courts exclude partial or incomplete recordings (where the officer improperly
failed to record all appropriate portions of the encounter) and impose a positive
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inference that the missing video would have provided information supporting the
member of the public (whether as defendant in a criminal prosecution or plaintiff
in a civil action) and running against the officer. This places a thumb on the
evidentiary scale in favor of the public’s civil rights, without requiring courts to find
that the officer intentionally hid or destroyed evidence of misconduct.123
III.
Citizen Video, the First Amendment, and the Problem of Rights
Enforcement
The trend is towards less publicly visible police-created video rather than
more—narrowing both the frequency of camera use and the availability of video.
The 2014 PERF Report recommended that departmental policies give officers
discretion over when to record, the position that most departments have
adopted.124 Most departments surveyed adopted a “limited discretion model;”
officers were required to record certain enforcement activities and given discretion
whether to record others, but given no guidance about whether or when to record
consensual encounters, the incidents in which many violations occur.125 In Michael
White’s words, if recording is not mandated, an incident will not be recorded.126
That approach comports with the preferences of rank-and-file officers.127 Police
departments and governments also have resisted making the resulting videos
broadly available, adopting “blanket, overly broad exemptions from public
disclosure.”128 State and local governments have exempted dashcam and bodycam
videos from open-records or FOIA laws,129 with departments using video more for
internal training than for public awareness of police activity or for establishing
police liability and accountability to the public.
Exacerbating that problem is officers failing to record (or to record fully and
completely), even when required to do so by laws and department regulations.130
Studies and departmental investigations have revealed officers turning off or failing
to engage cameras, whether erroneously or intentionally, resulting in non-recording
or selective and partial recording of events.131 Formal departmental policies, even
those requiring broader recording, yield to officer practices on the ground,
undermining the accountability and transparency goals and amplifying the “gross
imbalance of power” between police and the public.132 Fan’s proposal for requiring
courts to adopt inferences adverse to the government where video is
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inappropriately unavailable reduces some government incentive to limit the amount
of video.133
The answer to decreased police-controlled video—whether because of narrow
departmental recording regulations or because of officer disregard for those
regulations—must be increased citizen-created and-controlled video to fill the gap.
It ensures that there will be recordings of many police-public encounters regardless
of departmental policies or officers’ conformity with policies. But citizen-video fills
those gaps only if members of the public are constitutionally entitled and
practically able to record police activity and their interactions with officers. And
that may prove more difficult than it appears.
Six federal courts of appeals agree that the First Amendment grants individuals
the right to record police and other officials in the course of performing their
public duties in public spaces—Eleventh Circuit,134 Ninth Circuit,135 First
Circuit,136 Seventh Circuit,137 Fifth Circuit,138 and Third Circuit.139 The lone
contrary view came from Judge Posner dissenting in the Seventh Circuit, arguing
that the privacy concerns of the individuals interacting with police in the recordings
should prevail over any First Amendment interests the recorder may claim in
hearing and electronically capturing that interaction.140 But Seth Kreimer argues
that at least the early decisions recognized the right to record by assertion more
than by explanation or argument.141 Several scholars have gone beyond the courts
to identify the source, nature, and scope of the constitutional right to record. No
single free-speech theory links these arguments. But each offers a sound theoretical
basis for some constitutional right to record.
A. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record
The First Amendment does and should protect a citizen’s right to record
police performing public functions in public. The goal in this Article is not to take
or defend a normative position on the right or to evaluate the bases that courts or
scholars have used to support that right. Taking as a given the existence of the
right as elaborated by courts and commentators, this Part considers the problems
in recognizing, enforcing, and vindicating that right, whatever its nature, source,
and scope.
1. Scholarly Arguments
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This section considers five leading scholarly arguments for the right.
a. Seth Kreimer. Kreimer explores the expressive landscape created and defined
by the emergence of “pervasive image capture,” the combination of digital
photography, pervasive cell-phone cameras, and online venues for image sharing.
The result is that
almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide. We live, relate,
work, and decide in a world where image capture from life is
routine, and captured images are part of ongoing discourse, both
public and private. Capture of images has become an adjunct to
memory and an accepted medium of connection and
correspondence.142
Like words inscribed on parchment, captured images are expressive, part of
the cultural and political discourse. First Amendment protection attaches to all
such expressive images, whether used publicly or whether the individual creates the
images with the intent to use them. Pervasive image capture allows individuals to
record and reflect on their memories and experiences, an essential component of
the freedom of thought the First Amendment guarantees.143 And the technological
ease of capturing and recording those images cannot be disaggregated from the
technological ease of disseminating them, as both are part of a “broader digital
ecology of communication.”144
Citizen recording is constitutionally essential to balance official policecontrolled recording. Images are often more salient than verbal descriptions—
which is to say more powerful in their persuasive ability,145 not necessarily more
accurate or more singular in meaning. “Participants in public dialogue who are
barred from capturing images are at a substantial discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis
those who can record from life. Officials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance
of public encounters. A rule that bars citizens from capturing images gives
unbalanced authority to official framing.”146
b. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen. Building off Kreimer’s argument about
advancements in digital recording and distribution, Marceau and Chen argue that
this “creates transformative ways for individuals to participate in democracy and
inform public discourse about not only political and social issues but also broader
understandings about the truths of the universe, including complex moral
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questions,” such as abortion, food safety, and police misconduct.147 Recording
“add[s] to the body of knowledge about the most controversial aspects of
contemporary society.”148 And if recording itself is not a species of expression,
image capture is conduct that is “essential to speech;” as writing, speaking, and
other conduct used for expression are speech, so is the creation and production of
images that may be exhibited and viewed.149
Marceau and Chen define the scope of the right to vary by context. The
Constitution protects the right to record in locations where the recorder has a legal
right to be present.150 This includes publicly accessible spaces, on one’s own private
property, on another’s property with that owner’s consent or knowledge, and on
private property without consent where the recording pertains to a matter of public
concern or has a strong connection to public discourse.151 The right remains
subject to reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.152 And
it may yield to government interests, including protection of personal privacy,153
although nondisruptive recording in public (the paradigm for recording police
officers perfroming police functions) should remain immune from government
regulation.154
c. Carol Rice Andrews. Writing before the 21st-century explosion of citizenrecording technology, Andrews grounds a right to record in the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause, identifying a core right to file winning civil-rights claims against
government officials in court.155 That right to seek and obtain legal remedies from
government officials through formal government channels is at least as important
as the right to engage in general public speech about those officials.156 The Petition
right also requires “breathing room,” in the form of broader protections for related
non-core petition activities.157 One non-core activity is the right to file losing civilrights suits as a buffer for the core right of filing winning suits.158 That is, an
individual can file winning suits only if she remains free to file all suits and to risk
losing.
A second non-core right should be recording the public police misconduct that
gives rise to those winning civil-rights claims by those injured by that misconduct,
whether the recording is created by the injured person or by a bystander observing
the encounter. Either provides evidentiary value for subsequent litigation.
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Recording both “captures” the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the winning
claim and “preserves” evidence of the event that will be necessary to proving that
winning claim.
d. Jane Bambauer. Bambauer begins from the premise that the First Amendment
protects the “creation of knowledge. Expanded knowledge is an end goal of
American speech rights, and accurate information, along with other, more
subjective expressions, provides the fuel.”159 She defines a negative “right to create
knowledge” as a “latent prerequisite for free expression. Speech does very little for
a government’s constituents if it is not supported by commitments to free thought
and information flow.”160 This right ensures that government will not interfere
unduly with its constituents learning.161
Protecting the creation of knowledge includes protecting electronic data as
speech.162 Speaking of photography with reasoning that applies to live-action video
and audio recording, Bambauer argues that the First Amendment protects the
photographs or other recordings, not the act of creating those recordings. The
“very purpose of a photography ban is to prevent a wider audience from seeing the
scene” photographed, so a government-imposed restriction or ban on photos (and
necessarily on video- and audio-recording) must be understood, and declared
invalid, as “designed to cut down on communicative potential.”163 A “law
prohibiting the creation, maintenance, or distribution of digital information
attempts to achieve its social goals by limiting the accumulation of knowledge.
Data privacy laws strive to give individuals the power to decide who does and does
not get to learn about them.”164
e. Jud Campbell. Campbell defines “speech-facilitating conduct” as conduct,
often non-expressive, that facilitates or enables speech.165 He argues for a negative
“anti-targeting rule,” under which laws regulating non-expressive conduct raise
free-speech problems when singling out and targeting speech or the speech
process.166 This anti-targeting rule best explains protection for recording:
Cameras and other audiovisual recording devices are conventional
means of communication—that is, they are conventionally used for
communicative purposes. Targeted regulations of audiovisual
recording thus single out conduct commonly associated with
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expression and impose an apparent disproportionate burden on
speech.167
Campbell praises the Seventh Circuit decision in Alvarez that enjoined
enforcement of a state eavesdropping statute as applied to listening to and
recording of police officers performing public functions in public.168 The statute
operated “at the front end of the speech process by restricting the use of a
common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of communication.”169 The Seventh
Circuti recognized that the statute burdened First Amendment rights “directly, not
incidentally,” by “specifically targeting a communication technology.”170 On
Campbell’s model, the law targeted communication technology that, even if not
expressive in every use, had “readily apparent disproportionate effects on
speech.”171
2. Recent Judicial Decisions
In 2017, two courts of appeals sought to move beyond Kreimer’s criticism that
the right to record had been announced but not explained, by locating the right to
record within existing First Amendment doctrinal and scholarly norms.
The Fifth Circuit identified the right as an amalgam of the right to film, the
right to gather information, and the right of listeners to receive information.172 The
Third Circuit also placed it within the First Amendment right to access information
about official activities—recording is one way to observe, see, and hear what
officers do in public more accurately.173 That court also emphasized what Vincent
Blasi labeled the First Amendment’s “checking function” on government
misconduct, under which the press and public speak as a means to check, expose,
and stop government misconduct.174 Citizen-controlled video offers new and
different perspectives that compete with official versions of events, enabling
members of the public to perform a role similar to that of the news media.175
Both courts also acknowledged the increase in police-controlled recording.
Citizen-controlled video supplemented other video in spurring departmental
change, aiding and furthering investigations of wrongdoing, and confirming deadends where no wrongdoing occurred.176
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By framing the right in this way, the Third Circuit removed from the
constitutional calculus whether the recording citizen intended to disseminate or use
the resulting video. Requiring intent would produce too-limited a right. Intent to
publish may develop only later, once the recorder has an opportunity to review the
recording and to reflect on the story the video tells (in his subjective and politically
determined view). It makes no constitutional sense to allow officers to prevent an
individual from recording based on that individual’s present intent, thereby
depriving her of the opportunity to develop different intent to put the recording to
expressive use once she knows more about the recording and the events captured
and reflected in that recording.177
Nevertheless, the way courts have defined the right to record produces an odd
paradox. Government officials have a perverse incentive to record or to require
recording of as few encounters as possible and to disclose as little video as
possible, whether through policies, officer discretion, or officer disregard for their
regulatory obligations. Uniform recognition of a First Amendment right to record
would seem to restore the balance. If officers do not record and preserve a record,
members of the public will. But police officers have a complementary incentive
also to limit public recording or disclosure by involved citizens and bystanders,
thereby removing any video or audio record of an encounter.
Those incentives combine to eliminate any record of a police-public encounter
gone wrong, leaving proof to the he-said/he-said testimony that routinely favors
police and government officials. And procedural limitations on civil rights litigation
may mean that the mere fact of constitutional protection for citizen-controlled
recording may be insufficient to overcome perverse incentives or to prevent a
determined government or individual officer from deterring or stopping all
recording by all sources.
B. The Problem of Qualified Immunity
Constitutional challenges to police efforts to prevent a citizen from
recording—constitutional claims to vindicate the First Amendment right to
record—typically arise in § 1983 actions seeking damages for past, completed rights
violations.
In the typical right-to-record case, officers prevented an individual from
recording a completed encounter, then the individual sues the officer and/or the
municipality for which the officer worked for damages. Where no other
proceedings would allow them to assert their First Amendment rights, recording
plaintiffs may find that it is “damages or nothing.”178 In most cases, the recorder
was not arrested or charged for attempting to record.179 Or the recorder was
released after a brief “conversation,” likely designed to deter the person from
Fields, 862 F.3d at 358; Alvarez, 598 F.3d at 597.
Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971)
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attempting to record again.180 Or the recorder was arrested, but charges were
withdrawn when the arresting officer, recognizing their speciousness, did not
appear at the state proceeding181 or when the basis for the charges was revealed to
be invalid in that proceeding.182
The Fifth Circuit cited this procedural posture to justify taking the odd (and
arguably inappropriate) step of determining and announcing the scope of the First
Amendment right as clearly established “for the future,” without determining
whether the officers actually violated the plaintiff’s rights at the time and on the
facts at issue in the case.183 It feared this case or a procedurally similar damages
action provided the only opportunity to address the constitutional issue.
But executive officials, such as police officers, can avoid litigation and liability
on all claims for constitutional damages through the defense of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity provides that a government official can be liable for damages
only for conduct that violated a constitutional right that was clearly established,
such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated the
constitutional right at issue.184 No officer in the Fifth or Third Circuit cases was
held liable; all were granted qualified immunity, because the right to record was not
clearly established at the time of the challenged events.185 This followed two Third
Circuit decisions in which the court pretermitted analysis of the merits of the First
Amendment question and held that any constitutional right that might exist had
not been clearly established.186
The Supreme Court has made qualified-immunity doctrine strongly protective
of police officers, particularly on Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure and
excessive-force claims, to the point that it has become difficult-to-impossible to
establish officer liability.187 It has held that police officers were entitled to qualified
immunity in almost a dozen cases in the past decade, several of them summary
reversals.188 Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent and those
who knowingly violate rights.”189 A right is “clearly established” only by a strong
consensus of lower-court cases with somewhat similar facts and officers acting in
Turner, 848 F.3d at 683-84.
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similar circumstances, defining the right in light of the facts of which the defendant
officer was aware and not at too high a level of generality.190 The Court has been
coy about whether one binding decision from a regional circuit is sufficient to
clearly establish within that circuit, assuming it might but never finding the right
clearly established based on a single case.191 Policies of the relevant executive
department may provide officers with notice of clearly established law.192 A right
also may be so obvious that it can be clearly established as general principle
without factually similar precedent,193 but the bar for obviousness is high.194
The risk is that courts will apply qualified immunity in First Amendment rightto-record cases in a similarly officer-protective manner . The Third Circuit in Fields
concluded that the right to record was not clearly established despite the
unanimous view of (at the time) five sister circuits and every district court in the
Third Circuit to consider the question.195 It also refused to accept Philadelphia
Police Department policies and regulations as a basis for clearly establishing the
right. In the wake of prior right-to-record decisions, the department adopted
official policies recognizing a First Amendment right of citizens to record police in
public; the policy statements sought to eliminate officers’ confusion on the street,
to ensure officers knew their duties, and to place the department “on the forefront
rather than on the back end.”196 A Commissioner’s Memorandum stated that
officers should reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that they
“shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the recording devices.197 But
the majority emphasized evidence that the policies were ignored, were ineffective in
informing officers that the constitutional right existed, or were not being followed,
meaning the existence of the regulations could not show a knowing violation of the
First Amendment.198
Despite recent decisions and scholarly consensus, future § 1983 plaintiffs
seeking damages for the denial of the right to record may encounter a number of
problems. It is unclear whether six circuits provide a sufficiently “robust”
consensus199 to clearly establish the right. It is not certain that the right is even
clearly established in the Third Circuit or the Fifth Circuit (despite the latter’s
insistence that it was clearly establishing the right “for the future”200), as the

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999).
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct 2088,
2095 (2012).
192 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
193 Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
194 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 & n.3 (9th Cir.
2017).
195 Fields, 862 F.3d at 361-62.
196 Id. at 363 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 363-64 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
198 Id. at 361.
199 Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); City and Cty. of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).
200 Turner, 848 F.3d at 688.
190
191

Supreme has assumed, but never decided, that a right was clearly established in a
circuit by a single circuit-court decision.
Even if sufficient to clearly establish, precedent may lack sufficient factual overlap.
Distinctions are always possible and seemingly small and insignificant differents
may be sufficient to avoid liability in a doctrinal morass that one scholar compared
to the one-bite rule for bad dogs starting over with every change in weather
conditions.201
The Third Circuit in Fields found the right to record not clearly established,
insisting that no part of a broad canvas of existing law and policy allowed the
defendant officers to understand their conduct to be unlawful. Prior cases
recognizing the right involved individuals who recorded with the intent to publish
or use the video, establishing a right different from the one at issue in the current
case, where the plaintiffs recorded without clear intent to publish.202 The Seventh
Circuit decision in Alvarez did not provide sufficient notice, as it involved a
constitutional challenge to an eavesdropping law prohibiting listening and
recording, without regard to later use or publication of any recording.203 (Jud
Campbell argues that Alvarez should not be characterized as a right-to-record case,
because the statute prevented only capture, not dissemination).204 And the Third
Circuit suggested that there might be a constitutionally meaningful factual
distinction between recording a traffic stop and recording a sidewalk
confrontation,205 rendering the right not clearly established in the different context.
Factual distinctions prevented Turner from clearly establishing much.
Dissenting, Judge Clement emphasized that the plaintiff had been photographing
the police station building, which did not clearly establish the right to video-record
or to record police officers performing police functions.206
Any First Amendment right also remains subject to reasonable, content-neutral
time, place, manner restrictions,207 such as the officer’s needs for security and
safety, for himself and others, in performing public functions. This compels a new
inquiry in each case into the details of the events at issue and whether the officer
reasonably could have believed that having someone recording interfered with his
public duties, compared with previous incidents.
Even if the plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity and establish liability, a
plaintiff’s claim that a police officer prevented her from recording or momentarily
stopped and questioned her actions, although violative of the First Amendment,
may not produce substantial damages and may leave the plaintiff to recover only
nominal damages.208 This is especially so in circumstances such as those giving rise
to Fields and Turner, where no arrest or prosecution followed and any seizure or
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detention to stop the plaintiff from recording lasted a short time.209 The limited
remedy may remove the incentive for an individual to bring the lawsuit, especially
faced with overcoming qualified immunity. Right-to-record plaintiffs would benefit
from James Pfander’s proposal to allow § 1983 plaintiffs to forego substantial
damages and limit their claims to nominal damages in exchange for the elimination
of immunity as a defense.210 And liable officers likely will not pay even that
nominal-damages judgment, as government indemnify officers in virtually all
cases.211
Such disincentives or barriers to successful litigation decrease or limit the
amount and availability of citizen-controlled video. A determined officer might be
willing to shut down a person’s recording efforts, allowing him to avoid being
recorded (while not recording himself) and taking a chance that some legal or
factual distinction will allow him to avoid liability in the subsequent § 1983 action
or that any judgment will be de minimis and paid by the municipality rather than out
of his pocket.
C. Legislative Limitations
Officers are not recording even when required to do so by law or department
regulation.212 That issue is exacerbated by two policymaking problems. One is
inconsistency as to the level at which rules and policies should be made—whether
at the state, municipal, or departmental level, producing piecemeal and confusing
rules and obligations.213 The second is that those policymakers, whatever their
level, are enacting insufficiently broad recording policies and excessively narrow
disclosure policies.214
Citizen-controlled recording should fill the gap when formal regulations and
practical conduct combine to limit the amount of video evidence. But the same
state, local, and departmental legislative efforts that limit the creation and
availability of police-controlled recording could be aimed at citizen-controlled
video.
In 2015, Texas Representative Jason Villalba introduced a bill that would have
defined the existing crime of interrupting, disrupting, impeding, or interfering with
a peace officer to include “filming, recording, photographing, or documenting the
officer within 25 feet of the officer,” or within 100 feet if carrying a gun, with an
affirmative defense that the recorder was a member of or working for the media.215
209
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The obvious target, as the media carve-out demonstrated, was citizens recording
their police encounters or encounters they witnesses between police and other
members of the public .
Such a bill almost certainly violates the First Amendment. It runs afoul of the
newly recognized right to record, including in the Fifth Circuit. It treats expressive
conduct less favorably than non-expressive conduct—or, in Jud Campbell’s
framing, it treats non-expressive conduct that facilitates speech less favorably than
non-express conduct unconnected to the speech process.216 A person could be
within 25 feet of a peace officer, even when carrying a gun, if not otherwise
impeding the officer, so long as not engaged in the (expressive or pre-expressive)
act of recording; the identical person operating a recording device breaks the law.
But either person implicates the purported interest in non-interference with police
functions caused by citizen recording.
The legislation also treats media members more favorably than non-media
persons performing the same recording function. It is not clear how a media
member recording within 20 feet of the officer interferes or impedes more than a
non-media member in the same place or why media members should be treated
differently than non-media members engaged in identical expressive (or preexpressive) conduct.217 Although the right to record remains subject to contentneutral time, place, manner restrictions, the special disfavored treatment of citizencontrolled recording was not neutral as to speaker or content.218
Villalba withdrew the bill after receiving criticism from everyone on all sides of
the spectrum.219 But his failed effort does not mean that state, local, or department
officials lack the identical motivation to protect officers from the perceived
harassment and negative attention that comes from being subject to constant
recording,220 or to attempt similar, more competently drafted laws. As long as the
First Amendment right remains subject to neutral limitations, similar legislative
efforts can be expected to restrict when or how recording should take place, in
service of a purportedly neutral value such as non-interference, officer safety,
public safety, or protection of officer or public privacy.221
The inquiry does not end with the conclusion that such legislation violates the
First Amendment in the abstract. The inquiry does not end with the conclusion
that the purported interests described above are either pretext for government
wanting to hide matters from public scrutiny or should not be strong enough to
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justify a ban on public recordings.222 Right-holders must overcome procedural
hurdles in enforcing and vindicating that right and in obtaining constitutional
judicial remedies against enforcement of these formal laws, at least without having
to endure state enforcement and prosecution for attempting to record.
A person arrested or prevented from recording a police encounter pursuant to
a formal law or policy prohibiting recording could sue the arresting officer for
damages for violating her First Amendment rights (the same strategy as those
prevented from recording by an officer exercising individual discretion). That
plaintiff confronts the same problems—qualified immunity and the claim not being
worth significant money to even a prevailing plaintiff able to overcome qualified
immunity.223
In fact, this plaintiff encounters a greater qualified-immunity burden, because
the officer can defend his action on the ground that he was enforcing
presumptively valid state law224 or department regulation;225 he therefore was
neither plainly incompetent nor knowingly violating the First Amendment. The
plaintiff would have to establish that the statute or regulation was obviously and
blatantly unconstitutional, such that no reasonable officer could have believed the
recording ban he was enforcing could be valid and enforceable,226 a high burden
for a plaintiff to satisfy to avoid the officer’s immunity defense.
A plaintiff might instead sue the municipality, arguing that the officer arrested
him pursuant to a constitutionally defective formal municipal policy.227
Municipalities cannot assert immunity defenses,228 so the plaintiff could recover (if
only nominal damages) for the violation, even if the right was not clearly
established or if there are factual distinctions between his case and prior cases. But
if the challenged recording prohibition derived from a state statute (such as
Villalba’s bill in Texas), the violation in a case of arrest by a municipal or county
police officer would have been caused by state law, rather than municipal policy.229
Municipal liability requires that the constitutional violation be caused by the policy
of that municipality, not the policy of another entity that the municipality enforced.
A local practice or policy of generally enforcing state law is not sufficient to
establish liability for its enforcement of any particular constitutionally deficient
statute. Unless the municipality took additional steps to adopt the state prohibition
on recording as a municipal ordinance or department regulation or to promulgate a
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formal policy of enforcing that particular law, it likely is not sufficient to establish
municipal liability.230
A third option is a pre-enforcement action against state or local officials to
enjoin enforcement of the recording ban as violating the First Amendment. But
pre-enforcement plaintiffs may face standing problems.
Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons231 and Clapper v. Amnesty International,232 courts
are reluctant to accord standing to challenge law-enforcement policies and practices
that affect individuals only through attempts to enforce other substantive laws
against them. The plaintiff in Lyons lacked standing to obtain an injunction barring
city police from employing a constitutionally dubious chokehold in the future,
because he could not predict if or when he would be stopped by police for a traffic
or other violation, if or when the encounter would go south, and if or when the
chokehold would be applied.233 The plaintiffs in Clapper lacked standing to
challenge a federal law permitting certain national-security surveillance, because
they could not predict if or when they or people they communicate with would be
targeted for surveillance, successfully surveilled, and surveilled through the
challenged law, in government efforts to enforce other federal criminal and
national-security laws.234
A prohibition on recording only would be enforced against a person who was
arrested or seized by an officer and attempted to record their encounter or who
witnessed another person’s encounter and attempted to record it. Standing would
require courts to “speculate” that the plaintiff will be seized by police or will
witness another person being seized by police, that he will try to record the
encounter, and that he will be prevented from recording the encounter by an
officer arresting him or otherwise attempting to enforce that statutory recording
ban.235 A court may be unwilling to accommodate such conjecture in a preenforcement challenge, as opposed to an action in which the police completed the
violation of the right by preventing recording.236
Courts may apply more relaxed standing analysis to pre-enforcement First
Amendment challenges, being more willing to allow plaintiffs to preemptively raise
their constitution rights, rather than requiring them to engage in the targeted
expressive (or pre-expressive) conduct and risk arrest and enforcement of the
constitutionally suspect law.237 But even in First Amendment cases, standing
requires that the plaintiff have an “intention to engage in a course of conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and
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there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.”238 A plaintiff must show a
present intention to engage in the statutorily prohibited expressive activity at a
specific, imminent future, subjecting himself to likely enforcement.
The ACLU established standing in Alvarez despite the court recognizing that
the organization “does not know precisely when it or its employees would face
prosecution or which officers would be involved.”239 The court did not demand a
showing of intent to record at any particular imminent protest. It distinguished
Lyons, because this was not a case in which the threat of prosecution hinged on
unknowable future events or details of how the violation would occur. The ACLU
sought to implement an organizational program of recording police at future
“’expressive activity’ events—protests and demonstrations—in public fora in and
around the Chicago area.”240 Because the ACLU planned to attend many or all of
those events as organizational policy and practice and because such events were
certain to occur, the organization’s activity and the likelihood of enforcement
moved beyond speculative.
Media members might be able to establish standing along similar lines. The
media’s job is to observe, record, and report on public events, so enforcement of
the statute against them is less speculative; they will report on and attempt to
record future events such as public protests or rallies at which police might enforce
the recording ban and those rallies or protests are certain to occur. Of course,
media organizations and individuals working for media organizations were exempt
from Villalba’s proposed Texas bill241 and the Illinois law in Alvarez,242 and likely
would be exempt from similar legislative prohibitions on recording.
Jocelyn Simonson’s copwatchers243 also may be able to establish standing.
They work in organized groups of local residents patrolling neighborhoods in
planned times, places, and manners, monitoring police conduct, educating citizens,
and undertaking other efforts to deter police misconduct before it occurs.244 Videorecording is one recent addition to copwatchers’ repertoire,245 and their recording is
as deliberate, scheduled, and organized as their patrol activities.246 Like the ACLU
and the media, their regular organization and consistent activities allow them to
show the same present intent to record inevitable events on a regular basis through
their regular planned activities, even if the date or place of the events recorded and
of enforcement of the law is unknown at the time of litigation.
Ordinary, spontaneous, individual citizen-recorders working on their own may
not be so fortunate. They will be less able to show when or where they will be
involved in or will witness an individual encounter that they want to record, lacking
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formal job obligations or organizational plans to be at all or any events in which
recording, and efforts to enforce a recording ban, might occur. Unable to show
when or where they will want to record an encounter, they will be less able to show
when or where the recording ban will be enforced against them. Those isolated,
individual events look more like Lyons and Clapper, where the when and how of a
future encounter with police and attempted enforcement is less known and more
speculative or conjectural.
But the individual right to record police is most essential in these below-theradar individual police-public engagements, in which police incentive and power to
stop a single recording or to arrest a lone recorder are greatest. It is difficult to stop
dozens of media members or hundreds of protesters with cameras from recording
a public protest or expressive event (although police in Ferguson certainly tried247),
other than by halting the protest event, which raises separate, more fundamental
First Amendment concerns.248 Copwatchers describe a mutual respect between
themselves and the officers they observe, a sense that both sides are doing their
jobs, with no sign of officers trying to intimate the watchers or stop their activities,
including recording.249 Police historically gave media members freer reign in
covering protests and other events, although some of that deference was lost in the
Ferguson protests and since.250
Spontaneous, isolated, and individual recorders do not receive similar respect
or deference. It is easier for police to prevent a single recorder from capturing a
single encounter, whether her own or one she happens upon. Yet standing doctrine
may place these encounters beyond pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. The
result is a paradox—it is easier for police to enforce an arguably constitutionally
violative law, but more difficult for plaintiffs to preemptively challenge its
constitutional validity.
D. The Problem of Officer Discretion
Police-controlled video is marked by two trends: Departments according
officers discretion as to whether, what, and when to record251 and officers failing to
follow regulations when required to record.252 The trends are self-reinforcing, as
the failure to record can be defended as an exercise of discretion. The potential
limits on citizen recording described above enhance the power of official discretion
in halting citizen and police recording.
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It is reasonable to expect that officers would be more likely to fail to record—
intentionally or otherwise, as a matter or discretion or otherwise—an encounter
that has gone sideways and likely will embarrass the recording officer or his fellow
officers. Fan gives an example of a 2016 incident in San Francisco, in which
sheriff’s deputies beat a suspect with metal batons, inflicting head and arm injuries
requiring twelve days of hospitalization; ten of the eleven involved officers failed to
activate their bodycams and the one who activated his camera did so by accident.253
It is similarly reasonable to expect that officers, vested with similar discretion
by legislation or policy, will be similarly inclined to stop a citizen from recording an
encounter that has gone sideways, producing video that might embarrass one or
more of the officers or make them look bad to the viewing public. The unrecorded
2016 incident in San Francisco came to light only when a private video-security
system captured the incident, and the owners of the system gave the video to the
public defender.254 And one can expect that, had the officers been vested with
power and discretion to stop that recording or its release, they would have
exercised it.
The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect executive discretion, to give
police officers “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,”255
and to give them wide latitude in the vigorous exercise of that constitutional
judgment and discretion, rather than forcing them to steer too clear of the
constitutional line out of fear of liability.256 Legislators such as Rep. Villalba enact
statutory prohibitions on some recording to vest officers with additional discretion
and an additional weapon to control citizens and potentially embarrassing video.
The result undermines the force of citizen-controlled video in establishing or
restoring a better balance between police and the public in capturing images and in
ensuring police accountability.257
It is not clear how First Amendment doctrine might respond to this problem.
Executive officers cannot wield unbridled and untrammeled enforcement
discretion with respect to speech, as in granting parade permits.258 But discretion is
inherent in policing, including as to what laws to enforce, how, and when.259
Plaintiffs can state a First Amendment claim by showing that adverse police action
was motivated by animus or disagreement with the message or content of her
speech and with the intent to stop or retaliate against the speaker because of her
speech, although pleading and proving intent proves difficult for plaintiffs.260
Campbell’s framework for protecting speech-facilitating conduct, such as
recording, can map onto that intent standard, by subjecting to heightened First
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Amendment scrutiny laws and regulations that target the speech process by
targeting speech-facilitating activities such as recording for regulation or
restriction.261
An officer who wields that discretion to prevent a citizen from recording,
whether pursuant to a statutory recording ban or his own discretion, targets the
speech process when he is motivated by concern for, and a desire to stop, video
that might expose him or his fellow officers acting in constitutionally wrongful, or
simply embarrassing, ways.262 That standard was satisfied with respect to the events
underlying Fields, as police in two separate incidents approached both plaintiffs
with the intent of stopping otherwise-non-interfering recording.263
Courts overlook content-discriminatory animus in retaliatory-arrest or
retaliatory-prosecution cases where the officer had probable cause to arrest,
because the causal connection between animus and injury (the arrest or
prosecution) becomes more attenuated when probable cause exists.264 Plaintiffs in
video-recording thus face the same proof problems in showing that the officer
intended to halt recording to avoid being recorded performing his public functions
in a way that may subject him to embarrassment or liability, rather because he
reasonably and with probable cause believed the recording was interfering with
law-enforcement activities.
***
Citizen-controlled video, enhanced by a vigorous First Amendment right to
record government officials performing official functions in public spaces, should
be the answer to limits on the amount and availability of police-controlled video.
But procedural realities of qualified immunity, limits on standing, unavailability of
substantial damages make enforcement of that right difficult, and expansive police
discretion. And those difficulties together may limit the force of citizen-controlled
video as a tool for police reform.
IV.

Video and Remediation

The significance of video is not limited to litigation or the courtroom; it affects
how government and the public react to police-public encounters and the public
policy response to those encounters. The public takes to the streets to protest what
it perceives as injustice. And the public is more likely to take to the streets when
people can see and interpret video and when the results of formal legal processes
do not match their assessments of that video.265
In responding to incidents of police-involved force, government must account
for the public’s visceral, brute-sense impressions and interpretations of a video,
recognizing the Kahan insight that those impressions are determined by identity,
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ideology, political leanings, demographics, and experience. Regardless of how
policymakers interpret and understand a recording, they must consider different
reactions from a public that interprets a recording as showing police misconduct
and that becomes more outraged if government and government institutions do
not respond in (what the viewing public regards as) an appropriate fashion.
Governments respond to video and this concern in several ways. One is to
attempt to change the laws to keep video from becoming public, thereby limiting
the public response and public outrage. This explains Jason Villalba’s legislative
effort to ban citizen recording.266 And it explains efforts to exclude body-camera
videos from public disclosure laws.267 In 2016, Missouri enacted a broad, blanket
exemption from its open-records laws for bodycam and dashcam video,
concluding that making video public would interfere with ongoing police
investigations.268 That decision followed the state attorney general’s commission
recommendation that data from any “mobile video recorder” should be classified
as “closed records,” not subject to public request and accessible only to those
involved in the incident for purposes of civil litigation or by court order. The
attorney general warned of technology “lead[ing] to a new era of voyeurism and
entertainment television at the expense of Missourians’ privacy.”269
But as Fan argues, blanket, overly broad exemptions from public disclosure
defeat the basic transparency and accountability goals of police-controlled
recording.270 Video becomes a tool for protecting and exonerating officers against
public complaints within the department,271 without allowing the public into the
conversation to see and decide what happened and what the video reveals.
Alternatively, government may adopt a one-way disclosure policy, publicizing and
speaking out about video that (in its view) supports its officers and shows no
misconduct, while refusing to disclose images and recordings it views (and that the
public is likely to view) as adverse to police and government interests.272
A second, more positive, possibility is that public availability of video evidence,
however created, prompts institutions to be more aggressive in challenging police
behavior and seeking accountability for misconduct.273 There arguably has been a
gradual shift in prosecutorial aggressiveness against police violence, especially in
video cases, moving from the relative dark ages of 2014 to the present.
NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted for the 2014 strangulation
death of Eric Garner,274 and Cleveland police officers Timothy Loehmann and
Supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note ___, at 442.
268 Nixon Signs Bill, supra note ___.
269 Jesse Rifkin, After Ferguson, Missouri Legislator Wants to Keep Police Videos Private, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 23, 2015, 1:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/23/ferguson-police-bodycamera-videos_n_6735600.html.
270 Fan, Justice Visualized supra note ___, at 442.
271 Harris UNC Contribution
272 Iowa or Book.
273 Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision, supra note ___, at 644-45.
274 J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests after Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner
Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014).
266
267

Frank Garmback were not indicted in the 2014 shooting death of Tamir Rice,275
despite widely circulated video (from non-police sources) of both incidents. But
more recent cases have resulted in criminal charges and prosecutions—Ray
Tensing in the shooting death of Samuel DuBose at the University of Cincinnati,276
Yeonimo Yanez in the shooting death of Philando Castile in Minnesota,277 Jason
Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar Smith in St. Louis, and Philip
Brailsford in the shooting death of Daniel Shaver in Mesa, Arizona.278 Charges
remain pending against multiple Chicago police officers for the 2015 shooting
death of Laquan McDonald, where dashcam video, produced only after a statecourt suit and order compelling disclosure, helped expose an attempted coverup.279 A hung jury in the state homicide prosecution of Michael Slager in the
shooting of Walter Scott in South Carolina led to a federal civil-rights280
prosecution of Slager for depriving Scott of his Fourth Amendment rights, a guilty
plea, and a twenty-year prison sentence.281
The results of these cases may not reflect positive outcomes or what many
regard, based on their interpretation of the video, as justice. Each prosecution in
the first list was unsuccessful, resulting in acquittals or hung juries (sometimes
multiple hung juries). Only Slager seems likely to serve prison time. But the
increased efforts suggest some limited movement toward success. State and federal
prosecutors appear more likely to pursue criminal charges when video evidence, at
least viscerally, supports a view that the officer did something wrong.
Unfortunately, acquittals accompanied by graphic video, such as in the Shaver
shooting, reinforce the public belief that nothing is sufficient to convict a police
officer.
Bryce Newell describes an irony to this evolution. The demand for body-cams
and video, including among police officers, began following the unrecorded
shooting of Michael Brown. Subsequent cases featured video of some sort from
some source, resulting in prosecutions but not necessarily accountability, while
turning rank-and-file law enforcement off to cameras.282
A third possibility is that video of a police-citizen incident may prompt
municipalities to settle civil-rights suits more promptly to avoid further public
viewing, discussion, and debate over video that is subjectively perceived as
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troubling and to avoid the potential for anger erupting into public
demonstrations.283
Public attention and outrage over a viral video puts government on its heels
and prompts action; it must defend its officers while also reacting to adverse public
perceptions and conclusions. The result is a split response—no criminal,
administrative, or employment actions against the officers, but settlement as the
path of least resistance in civil litigation. The families of Scott, McDonald, Garner,
DuBose, and Castile settled with the officers and municipalities for anywhere from
$3 million to $6.5 million, often before or just after filing the lawsuit,284 even while
the officers in each case escaped criminal punishment.
Katherine MacFarlane describes these civil cases as utilizing “accelerated civil
rights settlement.”285 Plaintiffs bring or threaten bring small-bore § 1983 claims;
they seek only damages for the single event at issue, rather than systemic
departmental reform through broad injunctive relief; and the parties settle before
or shortly after filing.286 While these lawsuits do not achieve systemic police
reform—as would a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin a department’s stop-and-frisk
policy287—the settlements are with the municipality (rather than the officers288) and
are sufficiently substantial that the numbers might begin to add-up and prompt
policy reform to avoid future lawsuits and payments.289 Video, and government
fear of the public reaction to video that looks “bad” prompts it to pursue or accept
accelerated settlement and to end the legal dispute, and with it the popular
conversation and controversy around the video and the problematic police
encounter.
A final, ironic, option is for government to undertake the difficult task of
explaining to the public that it should not jump to conclusions about what
happened because video is incomplete, non-objective, subject to the limits of the
video frame, and open to varying interpretations based on the viewer’s political and
personal perspectives. Officials can urge the public to accept that one video does
not tell the whole story and to wait until they see and hear more video, more
evidence, and more sides to the story. But if the public’s brute-sense impression is
that the video is unfavorable to the police, as was the case in the settled highprofile death cases, this may prove practically and politically impossible.290 This
tactic also contradicts the government position, in and out of litigation, when
officials are confident in video’s officer-supportive message—then they insist that
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video is singular, conclusive, objective, unambiguous, and tells one story that
exonerates the officer on summary judgment291 or that justifies not pursuing
criminal charges against the officer. The cognitive dissonance and charges of
hypocrisy may be too much too overcome.
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